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The  Coronavirus  SARS-CoV-2  has  spread  rapidly  since  the  first cases  hit Wuhan,  China  at  the  end  of
2019,  and has  now  landed  in almost  every  part  of  the  world.  By mid-February  2020,  China,  South  Korea,
Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  – to  some  extent  – Japan  began  to contain  and  control  the spread  of  the  virus,  while
conversely,  cases  increased  rapidly  in Europe  and  the  United  States.  In response  to  the  pandemic,  many
countries  have  had  to  introduce  drastic  legally  mandated  lockdowns  to enforce  physical  separation,  whichandemic
olicy responses
olicy-making
are  ravaging  economies  worldwide.  Although  it will be  many  months  or even  years  before  the final  verdict
can  be  reached,  we  believe  that it is  already  possible  to identify  12 key  lessons  that  we can  learn  from
to  reduce  the  tremendous  economic  and  social  costs  of this  pandemic  and  which  can  inform  responses
to  future  crises.  These  include  lessons  around  the  importance  of transparency,  solidarity,  coordination,
decisiveness,  clarity,  accountability  and  more.
©  2020  The  Author(s).  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC. Introduction
The Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread rapidly since the first
ases in Wuhan, China at the end of 2019, now reaching almost
very part of the world. By mid-February 2020, China, South Korea,
ingapore, Taiwan, and – to some extent – Japan began to con-
ain and control the spread of the virus, while conversely, cases
ncreased rapidly in Europe and the United States. On March 13th,
he WHO  Director General declared Europe as the epicentre of the
andemic “with more reported cases and deaths than the rest of
he world” [1], but by the end of the month that label had shifted
o New York. Health workers around the world have described
ar-like scenes as health systems struggle to gain control over the
irus. In response to the pandemic, many countries have introduced
rastic legally mandated lockdowns to enforce physical separation.
lthough it will be many months or even years before the final ver-
ict can be reached, we  believe that it is already possible to identify
2 key lessons that we  can learn from to reduce the tremendous
conomic and social costs of this pandemic and which can inform
esponses to future crises.
∗ Corresponding author at: London School of Economics and Political Science,
oughton Street, WC2A 2AE, London, UK.
E-mail address: e.a.mossialos@lse.ac.uk (E. Mossialos).
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168-8510/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
.0/).BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2. Twelve key lessons
2.1. Transparency is vital
“Pneumonia of an unknown cause” was first reported to the
WHO Office in China on 31 December 2019 [2]; yet weeks ear-
lier, healthcare professionals had warned Chinese authorities that
a SARS-like illness was spreading amongst patients. Instead of noti-
fying those higher in the system, Wuhan authorities detained and
silenced physician Dr Li Wenliang on a charge of spreading false
rumours after he reported a novel illness in his patients in early
December [3]. At age 34, Dr Li passed away in February 2020 from
COVID-19 infection [3]. This tragedy highlights the critical impor-
tance of honesty and transparency. Modelling data suggests that
if action had been taken even a few days earlier, the subsequent
spread of the virus could have been limited dramatically. How-
ever, fears of economic and political repercussions silenced officials
who could have sounded alarms, and the virus was able to spread
exponentially. Other countries have also struggled to communi-
cate the epidemiology of this new infection, sometimes reflecting
the challenges of ensuring consistent and coherent messaging in a
fast moving situation, sometimes due to internal disagreements,5
but sometimes, for example in Brazil and the United States, because
of blatantly misleading comments [4] by political leaders and the
media. These too have consequences. President Trump’s praise for
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ydroxychloroquine, despite an absence of evidence of effective-
ess in COVID-19, meant that people who did need it, such as
hose with lupus, have faced shortages [5]. A lack of transparency
round the United Kingdom’s scientific advisory mechanism has
ndermined trust [6].
.2. Successful responses hinge on decisive leadership
Recognising its initial response errors, China showed lead-
rship in tackling the COVID-19 epidemic within its borders
y implementing stringent measures. Through a combination of
idespread testing and contact-tracing, legally enforced physical
social) distancing measures, and use of modern technologies such
s automated robot cleaners and facial recognition for contact-
apping, China has successfully slowed the spread to a halt: on
9 March 2020 – for the first time since the outbreak began in 2019
 China reported no locally-transmitted incident cases of COVID-
9 [7]. Other countries, such as South Korea, have followed suit and
ave also been relatively successful in controlling spread. Heads of
overnment in countries such as New Zealand, Germany, Finland,
celand and Taiwan have attracted praise for their decisive action
nd ability to communicate the rationale for their policies. As com-
entators have noted, they are all women [8].
.3. We  need unified responses to pandemics rather than diverse
isconnected strategies
So far, there has been little evidence of international co-
rdination, worldwide or within regional blocs, as countries close
orders and look inwards. WHO  has urged countries to implement
 comprehensive response to COVID-19 and to “Do it all.  . .Find, iso-
ate, test and treat every case to break the chains of transmission”
9]. Yet countries have moved at different speeds and intensity,
ften without consulting their neighbours. These responses some-
imes seem disconnected from the epidemiological evidence; some
ountries which have similar disease ‘curves’ are reacting very
ifferently. The strict legally backed lockdown measures imple-
ented in China and South Korea early in their outbreaks contrast
ith the dismissal of the risks of coronavirus, accompanied, at
east initially, by reluctance to impose stringent restrictions by
ome politicians in the UK and the US. In places with ‘softer’ ini-
ial responses (i.e. France, UK) the rapid increase in cases forced
eassessments, with adoption of increasingly severe measures to
rotect health systems at risk of collapse.
Today, over half the world’s population faces partial or full lock-
own restrictions, and the global economy has taken a devastating
it. Coronavirus, like all infectious agents, ignores geopolitical
oundaries and attacks people regardless of nationality; we  too
ust take a unified approach which transcends geopolitical bound-
ries both to tackle the virus and to transition out of market closures
nd lockdowns. As countries consider lifting these measures, they
ust consult with one another and avoid making decisions in iso-
ation. At the same time, they should also steer away from ‘one fits
ll’ solutions, and governments must consider their domestic cul-
ures and contexts before ultimately defining a ‘new normal’. The
uropean Union has published a roadmap setting out the princi-
les that should underpin decisions to open up, noting that health
olicy is a national competence, but decisions should be discussed
nd communicated with neighbouring member states [10].
.4. Effective communication must occur at the highest political
evelsIn recent decades, the world’s leading economies have created
tructures to allow coordination of policies, including the G7 and
20. There has been a disappointing lack of communication andy 124 (2020) 577–580
collaboration at the highest political levels. The first virtual G7  and
G20 meetings did not occur until mid-March – months after the
outbreak began in China. And even when these discussions did take
place, consensus lacked on a unified approach to COVID-19. When
the G7 met  on 25 March, instead of agreeing upon coordinated and
collaborative responses to the virus, disputes broke out about who
was most to blame for the crisis and a post-meeting joint statement
could not be put together [11]. Subsequently, the USA blocked a
statement by the G20 re-emphasising the global leadership role of
WHO [12]. In this, and in future epidemic and pandemic responses,
policymakers at the highest level need to engage with each other
early on to develop coherent and unified responses. They must then
communicate these to citizens, using every forum available.
2.5. The European Union, and other regional blocs, must assume
a greater health role
The current pandemic response has revealed serious obstacles
to concerted European Union action. Many European countries
responded late to the disease outbreak, and going forward, several
changes are needed. With treaties prohibiting ‘interference’ with
member States’ autonomy in operation of their own health sys-
tems, the crisis has laid bare the limited competencies in health that
member States have been willing to give their European institutions
[13]. Additionally, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) “has limited remit beyond the borders of the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA)” and there are legal barriers to sharing
public health data with countries, such as Switzerland, that have
decided to remain outside the EU’s legal framework [13,14]. Going
forward, the role of the ECDC must be extended and enhanced
with more funding for research and development (R&D) and pre-
vention efforts so that it can provide truly European (and not just
EEA) coordinated disease responses, working closely with the Euro-
pean Regional Office of WHO. COVID-19 will have major impacts on
all European economies and the European Central Bank (ECB) will
need to play a new role that goes beyond its traditional jurisdiction.
Yet the EU is only one regional bloc. Others, such as ASEAN,
CARICOM, and MERCOSUR are, to varying degrees, increasing their
role in health. Given the obvious economic impact of a pandemic,
this will have to accelerate.
2.6. Global solidarity is the only way to win the war against
COVID-19
Every country is making efforts to tackle COVID-19 and its eco-
nomic impacts within national borders. However, these efforts are
often disparate, and in some instances, even undermine global sol-
idarity. For example, early on in the crisis, it was reported that
President Trump offered large sums of money to CureVac, a Ger-
man  firm working on a COVID-19 vaccine, to persuade it to move
and give exclusive rights to any vaccine produced to the US [15].
When the outbreak began to ramp up in Europe in March, France
and Germany banned the export of protective personal equip-
ment (PPE) amidst severe shortages of such equipment elsewhere
[13,16]. China, after having weathered the worst of the outbreak, is
one of the few countries showing signs of solidarity and providing
support to other countries by donating PPE and lending medical
staff, a form of soft power that will not go unnoticed in the future
[17]. More of these coordinated responses are the only way to defeat
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.7. The WHO  has done a lot given the resources it has, but there
s much room for improvement. It must now focus its activities,
xpand its remit and enhance its operational capacity
The WHO  has continued to make use of available information
hroughout the different stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, but its
xperience has highlighted the need for greater focus, a wider remit
nd greater operational capacity. Based on what is often inade-
uate and uncertain data, the organisation has the difficult task to
nform populations of the spread and severity of SARS-CoV-2, while
imultaneously mitigating panic that could send economies into
ecession and even depression. Thus far, the WHO  has done its best
o communicate its messages effectively and has carefully escalated
he terminology around SARS-CoV-2 from outbreak, to epidemic,
nd to pandemic, based on available evidence. While these efforts
re commendable, the pandemic has highlighted the need for some
efocusing and increased funding to ensure the WHO  is capable of
oordinating global responses to major health challenges, includ-
ng the capacity to provide even greater operational support where
his is needed. However, it now faces enormous challenges as a
onsequence of President Trump’s widely condemned decision to
efund it [18].
.8. Existing global insurance institutions and policies are
nadequate, and these require significant changes and
mprovements
While several health security funds exist, these remain disap-
ointingly inadequate. In 2016, the World Bank established the
andemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) to complement the
lready-existing UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and the
HO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE). PEF was  designed
o release funds to countries and companies responding to pan-
emic outbreaks [19]. Yet, in reality, it is underpinned by bonds
ith complex terms that are “heavily skewed towards investors”,
ith a failure to pay countries affected in a timely fashion (if at all)
19,20]. While the global security space is crowded with insurance
chemes, none have proved to be adequate. Any new global insur-
nce policy must learn lessons from this experience to allow rapid
isbursement of funds to those who actually need them.
.9. Efforts to develop COVID-19 vaccines and treatments are
ommendable, but there is still much more to do
Countries and individuals around the globe are working to
evelop and manufacture vaccines and treatments for coronavirus
n an unprecedented way. Across government, private and phil-
nthropic donor spend, billions of dollars are being put towards
fforts to find an effective SARS-CoV-2 vaccine [21,22]. There are
ver 115 COVID-19 vaccine candidates in varying stages of R&D,
nd the number of clinical trials of potential COVID-19 treatments
nd interventions has surpassed 500 [23,24]. While of course, we
ommend the commitment shown thus far, the global approach
owards how we develop and test these vaccines needs to shift.
e believe the quickest path to successful development will entail
ell-organised, mid- to large-size clinical trials rather than the
ushed, small clinical trials that have failed to deliver so far.
Furthermore, once a vaccine is developed, the success of any
OVID-19 exit strategy will depend on the distribution of this tech-
ology quickly to those most in need. But currently, manufacturing
nd distribution channels do not have the capacity to provide access
o the billions of people who will require this vaccine [25]. We
herefore suggest that governments jointly purchase the patent
ights to these developments which would simultaneously reward
evelopers for their innovation, investment, and efforts, while alsoy 124 (2020) 577–580 579
allowing countries to rapidly manufacture and equitably distribute
the vaccines to all those in need in their populations.
2.10. We  need to test the responsiveness and resilience of health
systems and make changes and improvements based on the results
Financial institutions are regularly stress tested; a lesson
learned after the 2008 economic crisis. Yet while health systems
are essential to human wellbeing (as evidenced by the COVID-19
pandemic), the responsiveness and resilience of health systems to
epidemics and pandemics are rarely tested. Thus, as SARS-CoV-2
has spread across the world, health systems have been shocked
and found underprepared: countries such as the US, which relies
on China for the manufacture of over two thirds of the active
pharmaceutical ingredients used in the American generics market
[26], are highly dependent on well-functioning supply chains and
face threats of drug shortages when manufacturers elsewhere are
unable to do their jobs because of lockdowns and quarantines. Cru-
cially, if systems are tested and weaknesses identified, something
must be done. Unfortunately, this often does not occur in practice.
For example, after a major exercise in the UK in 2016 exposed a
shortage of ventilators, the issue was ignored [27]. Once the cur-
rent COVID-19 pandemic is under control, health systems should
be tested just like banks are to ensure they are resilient, and that
any weaknesses are addressed.
2.11. Accountability is critical for building trust and for sound,
inclusive decision making
Those making decisions must be accountable. The data, informa-
tion, models and the processes by which the decisions are made,
and their rationale should be available for scrutiny. Lack of clarity
or purposeful obfuscation leads to confusion and sows mistrust,
which undermines the response to an epidemic. Unfortunately,
some countries are failing to make their data public, or are not shar-
ing the information, models and assumptions on which decisions
are made. This ‘perceived secrecy’ has undermined trust in many
leaders. For example, in the UK, age and sex disaggregated data
on those infected with SARS-CoV-2 or those who  have died from
COVID-19 have only recently become available, making it difficult
to examine the assumptions used to make decisions.
2.12. There are opportunities to introduce novel approaches, such
as using robots and artificial intelligence (AI), in this – and in
future – pandemic response
The battle against novel diseases, such as COVID-19, may  require
novel approaches and technology. Robots and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) – immune to infection and able to be coated in decontami-
nating substances – can play a vital role on the frontlines of this
war. Already, we  are seeing the deployment of some of these new
technologies. For example, in some countries, drones are being
used to monitor people in lockdown and to deliver supplies and
equipment; in others, robots are screening patients and relieving
healthcare workers from some of their duties; furthermore, robots
which deliver food and medicines, and even ones that dance, are
offering emotional support and interaction for those in isolation;
and lastly, robots with UV units are being used to disinfect hospitals
and other large buildings [28]. There is a need to look at all options,
while ensuring that they are subject to evaluation.
3. ConclusionNow that SARS-CoV-2 has become a pandemic with close to five
million cases and over 300,000 deaths as a result of the virus, the
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echnologies is clear. It is also easy to see that in the past decade,
usterity policies have cut investments in health and these sys-
ems have too often been reduced or ignored. While it is essential
o cut waste within health systems, this pandemic highlights the
eed to have adequate capacity to address and tackle a crisis. It is
lso a reminder of the strategic importance of publicly accountable
ealth systems, underpinned by investment in people and tech-
ologies. We  must continue to build upon the lessons learned so
ar from the management of COVID-19 and adjust our approaches
o this pandemic, and to other future health and environmental
rises, accordingly.
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